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SI_kR¥
Human errors tend to be treated in terms of clinical and anecdotal de-
scrlptlons, from which remedial measures are difficult to derive.
Correction of the sources of hmnan error requires that one attempt to recon-
struct underlying and contributing causes of error from the circumstantial
causes cited in official investigative reports. A comprehensive analytical •
theory of the cause-effect relationships governing propagation of human
error is indispensable to a reconstruction of the underlying and contrlbu- •_
ting causes. This paper highlights a validated analytical theory of the
Input-output behavior of human operators involving manual control, communi-
cation, supervisory, and monitoring tasks which are r_evant to aviation, i
maritime, automotive, and process control operations. This theory of be-
havior, both appropriate and inappropriate, provides an insightful basis for
investigating, classifying, and quantifying the needed cause-effect rela-
tionships governing propagation of human error.
IK_ODUCTION
Human error is of major concern in the development and deployment of
man/machlne systems. Human error is a significant contributing factor in
aviation, maritime, automotive, and process control accidents. Thus the
alleviation in number and consequence of human errors should be a primary
goal of man/machlne systems research. Traditionally, however, human error
has been treated only tangentially. The measurement of task or system er-
rors has routinely been employed in man/machlne stud_em as a performance
metric in the evaluation of other variables (e.g., equipment design, train-
ing, etc.). Human error has also been used in clinical and anecdotal terms
as a convenient classification in accident invest_gatlons. Developing re-
medial measures from these appllc_tions is difficult, however, as errors
have not always been classified according to a consistent structure; and
other contributing factors or prevailing conditions have not been noted.
Recent research focusing directly on the nature and classification of
human errors is changing the abow_ state of affairs, however. SSngleton
(Refs. I and 2) has reviewed class:ficatlon schemes, analytical techniques,
and psychological theories in the study of human error. More recently
i Norman (Refs. 3 and 4) has been investigating applied human information
processing and has evolved an action theory which he has used In the ¢
* 1_is research was sponsored by the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Division,
Life Sciences Directorate, Ames Research Oenter, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration under Contrac! NAS2--10400.
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?classlflcatlon of errors made by hlghly-skilled operators In complex, high-
demand systems. Most recently we have finished a report for NASA (Ref. 5)
in which several behavioral models were reviewed for use in subsequent stu-
dies of human errors in aviation operations. These models cover continuous
and discrete control, supervisory control, monitoring, and decision making
and provide a basis for diagnostic investigation as _ell as research.
Human error is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. In accounting for
human error in complex man-machlne systems we must consider both the spon-
taneous errors or "slips" delt with in Norman's action theory (Ref. 4) and
more ratlonal errors (having an assignable cause in hindsight) which arise
due to problems in detection, perception, recognition, and Judgment. The
distinction here is that in one case the spontaneous error is seemingly
aberrant and unintentional, whereas other errors can presumably be ration-
alized with behavioral theories that account for perception, Judgment, de-
cision •_klng, monitoring, detection and recognition, and manual control.
DEMNTTIONS
In previous work by Beek, et al. (Ref. 6) hi.an error has been defined
as an inconsistency with a p_e..d_f_ed hehavio_t2Z rx_,tte_nestablished by
virtue of system requirements and speclflcaclons and the design of the
equlp_ent and procedures to meat those specifications. This is a practical
operational definition; however, it should be noted that incidents and ac-
cidents can arise because of inadequacies in the deH_an of equipment and
procedutes. Errors may also be precipitated by environmental stress (phy_
slological and psychological) impinging on the human operator. This has led
us to differentiate between the _ou_e¢_ and eauso_ of human error. ,_u_ee_
are internal to the human operator and their _onsequences should be measur-
ab!e as changes from normal or ideal human behavior which is cmasistent with
system requirements. Causer are external factors which induce undesirable
deviations in human behavior, such as unexpectedly large or extreme
dist:_rbances, high workload, distractions, inaccurate or noisy i_formation,
illusions, equipment design deficiencies, and inadequate training.
Accompanying the current trend towards increasing automation in man-
machine systems, there is increasing concern for errors induced by man-
.z
machine interaction (Ref. 7). In some cases errors _re induced by increased
eomplexlty _ the man-machlne Interface--and In other cases the operator's
less active role as a monitor and supervisor seems to be the problem because
there is a degradation of skill. At issue here Is what the optimal level of
operator involvement should be and the structuring of thla involvement in
order to minimize the occurrence and influence of human error on system
performance.
/
* There could, of course, be internal causes of htr_an error such as psy-
chophysiological or neurological impairments. These should be handled with
proper selection and periodic screening procedures which are not of direct
interest here. t
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Errors or mismatches between desired and actual system or subsystem
outputs are essential in situations where feedback is involved as an oper-
ating principle. Most of the time human operators use these errors to ad-
vantage in performing as error-correctlng rather than error-avoldlng system
elements. For this reason in operations involving aviation, maritime, and
automotive traffic control and process control, the errors per se are of ;
. major concern only when they are undesirable because of their size, timing,
or character. These errors, which are intolerable in one way or another, we
shall call grievous e_o_8. In general, a 2_evous er.,o_ will involve an
ezeeedeneeof safe ope_tinH tole_ce..
Human errors that do not always result in grievous errors may be nearly
impossible to measure in practice unless behavioral identification tech-
niques are employed. Behavioral identification may be performed by quali-
fied observers (Refs. 8, 9, and I0) or by signal correlation analysis which
can partition human error into coherent and incoherent components. Such
identtflcatlon of human errors which may be inconspicuous in one situation
is very important, for they may lead to grievous errors in other clrcum-
stances. Thorough analyses of mission phase behavior sequences, both normal •
and abnormal, are necessary prerequisites to the application of behavioral J
identification techniques in the study of human error. Before considering
some of the sources and causes of human error, we shall discuss the buildup
of mission phase behavior sequences from constituent task behavior.
BUILDUP OF MISSION PHASE BEHAVIOR SEQ_N_(S) FROM {_}N_I1_Zl_r TASX BEHAVIOR
A Perceptually Gentered Viewpoint for Task Behavior \
For a particular task the human component(s) as Input-output elements
consist of one (or more) of the pathways illustrated by Fig. 1 for one among
several human operators of a system. Here the system inputs and errors may
appear in several sensory modalltles, and the motor subsystem output may be
manipulative or verbal. The pathway used in a particular circumstance
is the result of the nature of the perceptual field and of training.
Table I summarizes these and other facets of this perceptually centered
model of human behavior.
The human's operatlons are thus F_,_-_--___] 'i
defined as an open-loop, closed-loop, ........
or open- and closed-loop behavior ,,_
pattern with identified sensory input " .,,,_-o..... e'_'_
and motor output modaltttes. For .... ' '"
some inputs, of course, there is no ;.....I °"_''I_-------_I
immediate output; instead, the infor- -'"---L-,)'SZLI_ _ .... °"'1 A
mation received may simply be stored . I '_ [.... I
_in memory. In other cases the lack -_...... c,,,,,
of a measurable output should none-
theless be interpreted as the 0 por-
rlon of a 0,I binary pair of Figure I. Three Paths in Perceptually
possibilities. Gentered Model of lluman Behavior
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TABLE i. SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF PAT._dAYS IN PERCEPTUALLY-CENTERED
MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR ;.
CORRELATESOF
PATHWAYS PERCEPTUALFIELD CONTEt_T ACTION OR OUTPUT TRANSITIONA/,DNG
SELECTED LEVELSOF SOP
Cc_pensator_ Narrow; deviations only Designed to correct exceedences
and reversals; not necessarily Jk _
rehearsed o
?.4
Bro der;seeablein.is, vesi edcorrect 0 o
outputS, co_m_'nds, d!stuzbances stud to compensate fcr inter- =_ " _I _ _ " i
in addition to deviations nal delay; moderately well _ _ _ _ i
rehearsed _ _. so
Precognitive ExceedinglYtended,even amongotherbr°adand ex- very wellr hesrsedDi'crete;cue_, transient; _ _ 0q_ _ i
llo
by eansoraco rere. e,by
recallof past experience,or _ _ ,_' _ 5 I_by recruitment o£ other . _ ,
reso_rces; separableinputs, _ _ I
outputs,commands,distur- ._ !
b_ces only; feedbacks not " i '[ '[necessary
MvnlZorlngaad l)eclslonMaklngVlewpolnt forT ask Behavior
With increased use of automatic controls and computers in modern day
aircraft, traffic, and process control systems, the role of the human opera-
tot is becoming more supervisory, involving increased amounts of moultorlng
and decision making. In these roles, human outputs are typically discrete
(as opposed to continuous control actions) and include verbal communication
as well. Monitoring and decision making errors can arise due to mlspercep-
tlon of monitored information and misinterpretation of perceived informa-
tlon. Errors can also occur in the more cognitive aspects of decision
maklng where the operator must account for various possible consequences of
the alternative actions available to him.
Monitoring and decision making constructs and viewpoints are useful in
several ways. First, human errors sometimes appear to be inexplicable when,
for example, only two courses of action are possible, and an operator ap-
pears to make the obviously wrong choice. By considering the elements of
these task situations in a decision making context, one can gala additional
inslght into the underlying factors involved. Second, if specific analytic
declsion-making models are appr_prlate descriptors of the mission phases
being examined, then the model can serve as a means for the analysis and
interpretation of the operational or experimental results. Third, a
combination of monitoring, decision making, and control vlewpolnts is
essential in treating repeated trials in an experiment or an ensemble of
simulations involving many crews. In a single trial, behavior and
performance for all the tasks involved are specific concrete actions (or
inactions) flowlng in a sequence. Error is identified as an extreme
deviation from a desired state. Among many trials these concrete actions
often exhibit differences, either in kind or in degree. A probabilistic
structure for particular events then becomes appropriate as a means of
describing the experimental data. Further, the potential tradeoffs (based
on experience and training) involved iv selecting various emergency actions
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can be exposed in the light of a utility concept. Monitoring and decision
making theories are the appropriate vehicles for such considerations.
Partition of the M/salon into Phases, Tasks, Skills, and Outcomes _.
If we are to apply these elementary behavioral models to complex opera-
tions of men and machines, they must be associated with sequences of ,
operations which, together, serve to accomplish a desirable end, i.e., a
mission. To accomplish this the mission is first defined and partitioned
into a hierarchy of constituents. The primary constituents are nr_Bsion
phases. These are of a size and duration which allow the broadest factors
(e.g., environmental varlables) that influence human behavior to be identi-
fied. At the next level are tasks, which are associated with a particular
operation in a sequence and are sized to permit the identification of
"critical" skills. Aberrations in the execution of these skills ultimately
determine the sources of contributions to human error.
A mission phase may be broken down into various subdivisions depending
upon its complexity. For our purposes here we are ultimately interested in
the elemental unit of all phases involving the human operator, the task. As
a working definition here we will define a task as an act_vit_ at the funo-
tiona_ _nte_face of the human ope,ato_ and the in_Loiduals, o_jects, ard
environments _it_ _om o, whic_ he inte,acts (adapted from Ref. II). We
will further specify a task for our purposes here as a goal- or criterion-
oriented work increment involving application of a ekiZZ or set of skiZls by
the human operator. Thus, by partitioning the mission phases into tasks, we
can then identify those fundamental humph operator behavioral factors,
s_il!s, which influ_'nce operational safety. For tasks which are critical to
safety (i.e., exert a predominant influence in some sense), it is the _.o-
ficieneu with which a skill or set of skills is applied that we wish to
consider in order to identify the underlying sources of human error.
In preparing the operations breakdown for a particular mission phase,
each task for each operator is listed as an item in an ordered, nominal
sequence. (bnceivably this order might be changed or omitted in off-nomlnal
circumstances, and this by itself may be a csuse of error. Associated with
each task are input and output modalltles for each operator in his respec-
tive relationshlps wit}" other operators and equipment. Associated also with
each task is an indication of the human behavior characteristics nominally
involved in carrying out the task at hand. In many cases the nominal
behavioral characteristics may not be exhibited by actual operators, and ab- /
normal behavior may result in an out-of-tolerance system error.
For the study of human error, the nominal task breakdown must therefore
be further subdivided to account for all possible outcomes induced by ab-
normal behavior. In this endeavor the application of Murphy's law and its
corollarles can be helpful. Other off-nominal aspects which should be
considered are the accumulatlon of stress and degradation of skill. Each
mission phase presents a combination of e_vi_o_enta_ and tae_ _tresses on
the operators, and these stresses influence operator performance. After
lapses in operational practice or long intervals of inactivity, individuals
have to cope with the problem of maintaining proficiency of skills which may
be critical to safety. Skills performed infT_eouent_, for whatever reason,
are most likely to fall into this category. Of these s_lls, those having
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, high workload factors by virtue of being tlme-constralned or because they
involve complex operations are most likely to cause serious performance •
decrements. Several conditions may contribute to the degradation of these
skills: (at lack of practice, (b) Inability to practice in the appropriate
environment, (c) interference or negative transfer arising from the practice
of competing skills, and (d) physiological decondltlonlng due to fatigue _
induced by the environment or due to alcohol or drug stresses. The tasks
• which are most likely to be affected by these human conditions should be
especially flagged for investigation,
In most of the tasks where precognitive operations are identified as
nominal or customary, additional qualification Is necessary. Such open-loop
operations are normally of limited duration and are properly interspersed or
concluded wlth closed-loop operations either directly, as In dual mode con-
tinuous control, or indirectly in the context of an off-llne supervisory
monitor. Omission of the closed-loop monitoring activity may in fact lead
to human error as shown in Ref. 12. To examine the role of a supervisory
monitor In more detail, we next consider some models for the integration of
the three functional pathways in Flg, I.
INTEGRATION OF TI_ PAT_AYS--TllKNETA_NTROLI._
Each pathway In Flg. 1 contains a number of subsets of behavior appro-
priate to the task. Assume that identifiable prerequisite conditlons and
limits can be found (e.g., experlmentally) for each subset of observed be-
havlor. Then one model for the perceptual organization process would be an
active off-llne supervisory monitor which identifies the conditions that
currently exist, selects and activates some most likely pathway/subset,
monitors the result, reselects a new pathway/subset when necessary or when
further informattou is identified as a result of the first operations, and
so forth. Appropriately this has been termed the metacontrol system by
Sheridan in Ref. 13. A simplified diagram of such a metacontroller is given
In Flg. 2a. Other preliminary work on an algorithmlc-type model for the
successive organization of perception (SOP) process is given in Ref. 14.
The possibilities for error due to inappropriate activities within such a
system are manifold. Such a model provides a logical basis for under-
standing some of the causes underlying selection of an inappropriate be-
havioral model which may ultimately lead to an identifiable error.
An appropriate form for this model is a flow or decision process al-
gorithm. R_lated models have been described in Refs. 16 and 17, and applied
to a specified task involving a given sequence of subtasks in Refs. 18
through 21. Thus the algorithmic approach is by no means novel. Most of
these attempts have had limited application because of the inordinate com-
plexity and repetitive cycling required to represent continuous tasks. Yet
by breaking out the compensatory and pursuit pathways as separate entities
which handle most of the continuous operations, the metacontroller of
* Metacontrol = the human's activity-supervising control, transcending the
various directly involved systems such as the perceptual, centrals and neu-
romuscular systems (from Greek "meta" meaning "involved vith changes"),
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Figure 2. Flow Diagram for SOP Operations and the Ref. 15 Theory of Action
Fig. 2a gets around some of these problems. A1gorlthmlc models are used
where they are best suited (logical functions), while isomorphic models of
human behavior are used where they are most efficient (veil-deflned tracking
or stlmulus-response situatlons). Continuing research in the dlsclpllnes of
observation, pattern reco_nltion, estimation, and tlmeshared processing
should yield additional materlal useful to the interpretation of SOP. For
example, Noton offers a sequential pattern perception and recognition theory
in Ref. 22 which appears to have connections vlth SOP and other models vhlch
have been found useful in characterizing human behavior.
A particularly interesting parallel to the SOP metacontroller which isL
especially valuable for the understanding of error is given in Ref. 15. The
"Theory of Action" proposed there has a number of cognitive stages and com-
ponents. 1"he base stores for acticn are organized memory units or sensorl-
motor knowledge structures _ "schemas" which control skilled action st-
: quences. A basic control sequence starts with intention, and proceeds
through selection, activation, and triggering of sche* _ to result fn an
output action. The results at various levels in this sequence are
monitored, and may be modified by feedbacks to the previous stages. A slm-
pllfied block diagram for this theory is sho_n in Fig. 2b. Its elemsnts are
clearly similar to the precognitive elements in the metacontroller of
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Fig. 2a. Huch of the Fig. 2b model is based on the study of verbal "slips,"
which can be errors by another name; so the connections between human manual
control and verbal activities are very useful in our search for
generalization.
Using this overall structure as a point of departure, we progress in
the next topic to discuss some sources and causes of human error.
SOUR(ZSAND CAUSRS OF HUNANEitltOR
The functional pathway triad and metacontroller model for human be-
havior illustrated in Fig. 2a contains within its structure many features
which can, in abnormal versions, lead to grievous system errors. These
features we shall refer to as sou_oea or anteeed_ts of error. Sources are
endogenous or internal to the human. Their consequences are all measurable i
in terms of changes from ideal or nominal human behavior for a particular
task. These changes may be induced by external (exogenous) factors which
will be referred to as oaugee of errors. The first two columns of Table 2
illustrate these distinctions for compensatory operations.
The remaining two columns of Table 2 present a verbal synthesis of a
great deal of empirical data from many experimenters. All of the currently
demonstrated forms of abnormal compensatory Input-output behavior are
represented here. In total they represent an error source which can be de-
scribed generally as inapp?,op_iate perception, _oieion, cmd/o_ _ze_ution
_tbin a eeZeoted ZeveZ fin this Ùasa, oompenoato,y) of o_o_inati_ of
be_vior. The sources of error in this framework are summarized in Table 3.
In principle tables similar to Table 2 can be constructed for the other
source possibillties in Table 3, e.g., Table 4 for pursuit operations.
However the experimental da_a base for most of these is nowhere near as
comprehensive as it is for the compensatory pathway. Many of else elements
in the precognitive pathway can be developed, by analogy, from Table 1 of
Ref. 15, which lists the presumed sources of "slips" (or errors) in the
structure of Fig. 2b.
Transitions from higher to lover levels of ski11 occur when the atten-
tions1 fie1. becomes Coo narrow. They can also occur when the human is
sufficiently impaired perceptually (i.e., by alcohol, fatigue, hypoxia, ""
etc.) so that action an a multi-channel operator is significantly de-
graded. In these instances divided attention is posslble only by switching
to and fro as an essentlally single channel information processing device.
Although probably one of the most fundamental sources of human error,
the inappropriate o_ani_at_on of perception and behavior for the task at
the executive level of the metacontrollez has received much less attention
in the llterature than have inappropriate perception, decision, and/or exe-
cution oithin a selected level of behavioral organization. The SOP theory
described in l_ef. 23 offers s unifying approach to inappropriate oT,ganizo,-
tion as a source of human error.
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tABLE 2. BEH,W!ORAL SOURCES OF ERROR IN COMPENSATORYSYSTEMS
;I:;_L: CH,'&'I_LOP£1b%T.[GI_ >
\
_sic _eu_cE CAL_ZS OPZ_A_OR B_RAVIOR m)'Z_'s C::_::w.:
i ii| ii ,,-
£Xtr ._.c c_,-,_ndor bn-_:ct ,_.l_yl_r£e ccr_._r.l Operator re_l_nge normal 5y_te: overlcadcl, [crc,.-i ut
li-turb_nce amplitudes or cxtr_..meenvirorJme.nt cf tclera;.c_ ulth,.u_h
f rx:ratir._prLperly
L_trcme co_ or BroadbaM inl_It "-ilnal noise; Regres_ioa of crcssovcr R_.i'_ccl_yst_"_ t_:._gi_.th
disturbance bar_Ivldth Unexlmcte,ily broadband frequency
dlsturbanec
Controlled-element tlul_uretton/failure in Affectlnl output for Tra:.:..-nt-rrcr: i,r-:.dtrzr.-
change controLtcd element transient interval; :/t._n;
Adaptation to new controlled Red,tel -y_t°.mb-r.l'w_AtL
el_t
_i_ced etter.tion Foot sit_-_l/noile ratio Operator threihold, net gain System bmald_dth reduct'_cn;
f:e_d (e.g., poor eontrast_ high reductto_ (mtls_d li_Ptals a _- one
tr, ten_ity dLtstraction extreme)
_tL=u_L, low tevcl ._t_ls,
etc. )
_cv_.rsals .__sI>'rc.:ptzon cf "l r_r _g,n; Re=r_mt it.crest : ; Ir.crea:-_.2 .y: t_: r_ . ".: ;
N_tvet,_ Intermltt-.ntl_vr_.vcraed int._r-_ttcr.'_lyr..v,..r:.i:)',tem
output c_tpu_
._Aslc& ._zz CAtBES OPE_O_ m_tVIOR _F_C%S ON SYS_:,:
i iiii
•'._.i ,:t "tl,_a, £ncrease,i _nfcrmstionsl Re=J.ant there&as (scanning ; .nero.see4 _y:ter :c'.:_;
...._r, ,,L .. ,_.nir.g r_quCremcnts for monit_Lnl Iner-ase in loop _air_; :.t.ce: -',r_ail-.',
ur control Stem.Z_aneotts mu_t:-,:h_nnei
operation,s
Information overload: As abowe_ itZu_ fallu_._ to .3".,.,'at..:.;
To_ many separate input detect some sllnais, "L; ;:I re-p_r._:;
channel_; tncrealed Zatencles, and :._:t-b:_A'y :- "P.'-: _= -',:,;arc
T_ =_ny s_T.Lftc_r.t -'i_als; =_s|ed output reslx, n_es _.:::,
_acklo t of _.sttended
operat Lunl
,_.ecd attc'.t'o:al Operator _Irment /fatt_e, Pe._._nt ir,:rease over s¢_r.nln6; r.crea:e_ _y_ten ¢, tee
f.et! alcohol, h_la_ etc. ) _rther Aecre_se in I_ gain; l_=4_l_e"I tandwtdtM
,quent'aL_-zwitohed sJ_ll_ :n:r_ased Latenete|
ch_r.nci _peretic,tl ;
,clcttort/mi3:ed relpOl_lel YAIICd resp_Tl_es
li_._ur_, kLr.etosis Cc:_fltct betwe_t or am_n_ [_,m_at_tincrease; £ncrease_,t system noise '#,
v. _.1, v_-_tibu_ar, =ttrel, [_cr_a..e _n operator's lain; _e(_-4 t...n._'._,_th
k:_.. th 'tt: _n_/or pr_- "_i a pro_s responJes; _hl • pr_ix" re:_>.n'.-.:
_r.,.," 'i)tt_ _nputs YJ.ssed resl_el )4_s3ed re "_ Me:,
CONCLUSIOIS
The fnput-output behavior of human operators in manual control systems
is characterized by an internal organization involving three major path-
ways. These correspond to closed-loop, combined open- and closed-loop, and
open-loop behavior patterns. In manual control systems which exemplify
these patterns, the system bandvldths, attentlonal fields, and rehearsal
requirements are ordered correspondingly, i.e., compensatory < pursuit <
precognitive. Similar but inverted orderings of perceptual motor loading
and system latencies are associated with the three pathways.
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TABLE 3. SOURCES OF HUMANERROR
(Sources are ondo8cno_s or lntoml to the hune_ operator by definition)
Inappropriate perception, decisioo, qnd/ot exertion within a selected level of behavioral
or|inilo_l_o
Coepenaetor I (ex_emled in Table 2)
i_rsult (nnpondod Im Table A)
Preco_nitivo (expanded l, TaoIe i of Ref. IS)
Selection of response unit
[xccution of rcsponas
Transitions froql a hiKher to lover level of behavioral orAmnizqt ion
Pre¢ojnittve to pursuit
PtocoKnlttvo tO coqpensatory
]l_drsult to cO_qlatory
Inappropriate orsanitstioo of petceptieNi and behavior for the task st the executive IPve| of the
uticontrollet
(Itm I-5 Ire associated with the "situot|cm identlfleatioe" block le FII. 2s)
_rrorl In:
(l) Yorm_lailon of Intent, IgllilOt Of function and its priority
(2) identlftcatlor of specific tesklsttuatlon/sction contlnu4_, or discrete
(]o) Selection of likely mrceo ef inforution end their temporal order (l.s., past.
current, or preview)
()b) klsl|neulnt ef priority In s_rcss of Infornlatl,_n ason E tnlmt* and feedbacks
(4) fdentlfyin| predictability or cehornecs In and aam,q sources of infarction
IS) Zdontlfyto| feel|airily with the task
(Item i Is associated with the "selection of appropriate pathway(s)" In riB. 2a)
(6) OrAsni|in8 operation on !spurs end feedbacks.
inadequate off-ft.* mhniter/aul_rvlsor in the tetecentrolirr
The three-pathway _odel for manual control can be generalized to a
perceptually-centered model appropriate for Input-output human behavior
Involving sensory moda;itles other than vision and output modalltles other
than manipulation.
The percep_ualty-centered nK)del for human behavior is further general-
ized to Include an executive and supervlsory-monltorlng metacontroller ;hlch
identtfies the situation, selects the appropriate pathway, directs the in-
formation flow through the pathway selected, and monitors, on an off-line
basis, the resulting outputs. The off-line monitoring feature constitutes
yet a.other feedback, albelt on an intermittent and longer term basls.
The characterization of human behavior presented here provides a
ratlonal basis for plannlns specific investigations of the aources of human
error, either for the purpose of research in advance or dia_uosls after the
fact. l_hen the purpose and scope of an investigation has been set forth,
the behavioral models summarized here can be used to predict (sometises),
subsume, describe, end rstlonaIize the experimental or operational results.
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TABLE 4. BEHAVIORAL SOURCES OF ERROR IN PURSUIT OPERATIONS
(Multi-Input Operations, by Definition)
/
!- basic SOUl_E CA_'I_ OPERATORI_,f_YlCt _._ Oil $'P371_4
I CmDo_ ) __ (_oG_u) ,,m
CortroJtod element (see eorreelx_dLr_ eatmes £n Tymu_e_ I_a_Folsiotl _ eol_ _w_na£ent ewFq_8 4_rU_8cl_,ce Tabl 2) penJator 7 !ml (see *_r_tU_i
ccn'_epcmLt_ behBvtLc_r £a IkHh_epd s_tlm Im.qdvld'.._
Table ,_)
P:v,d*:d _tt_nt£on, (see com_p(mdln4 causes Ib_t J_ere_e| I_re_ syStol nctJe;
r' rc,.pt_l _carJ_Lni In Tab_ 2) I_creU¢ _A _pea_atorts 881n; lied-_ed be/_twtdtb;
(_ee al:c e-rre:p_ndln_ (see e£:o corre_pr._r4
beJ_v_or £n Table I) e_rect= £n Teblt 2)
k, :'_e'.' _t£ ._.tz, zal i_r input _r,l/c error P_nt .ncre&:e; ]_nel_&=ed ,yYtel r_i'-e;
Y _1: _t. _t_al =[ipts]/noLse r_'.Lo _¢._., Operator'= threshold tm L_t Reduced sy_tel bL_r_.dth
_: :i_r.; ird_lllty t¢ Lde_t_ _n_it. _my csuse -tssed reeves (e-seed re:l:_r_et as ane
Task ll_ol_ms d_stur_ce I_d re|ressi_ _ c_lp_M_* extreme)
faction rsth_ r than c_- _1_ _r_ll;
asnd-fo_lo_ln4 an_ dieter- Opqff&t_r*s t_reshold _ el'_r
barge can_¢t be _d_nt£f_ed; my reduce I_£n In or _n
Wslt:_d se_l_ be_veen _n_atxw_ loop
tnput and error; (see alJJo corrmelpoe_lAn41
Distortion of tnp_t; behavior tn Tlb_l 2)
Lack cf input conf.mbl].lty
with YLsual /_eld;
•_cr el , corresp_nd/nl_ ¢&_Sel
_n TaLle 2
Reduced attent_onal In_L!_ry t( _der.ttfy _ture As sb_ve, pILL" increased As abd_*, plum le_m ed
field it. tel_xral :r.pu'. _r _L_tarbsnc_; ]akte_.cie._ tellM_ule laten_ie8
dL_:.sior,, t .r., Pr_L_o_ extrlpoLatto_
rad'.ced _r_rviev required to cite'rote
_r.put or _lsturbanee
ReV_r_L1J P_rcep_ LmrersL*-, of Ln_t; I_m_nt _ncre&se; l,u'Ir_ssed syoU,m no_se;
Lack of _n_a_t c_aformtbtltt)"
vtth vilu_l f:Le_d
ll._$on_, kinct_*Ls (see corr_s_v,t.r,_; u._-e_ tn Itmul_t £11_eaee; Incr_aae_ l_,l_ _oise;
Ta_I_ ;_) [_.cz_sse tn optmtnr*s |sLh; h_q;ed beaduSe.th;
_1 • lwop_ response,; '2_ • propoe _e,;
)_:sed reslx_ses KIlled relpm83ee
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